I. Introduction
The contemporary Internet found its inspiration in the Cold War. During the 1960s and 1970s United States Department of Defense personnel and academics from a number of American universities joined together to build an interlinked network of computers capable of surviving a nuclear attack. That network manifested itself in the ARPANET. Its survival capability rested not upon some elaborate new technological discovery but instead upon a brilliantly simple strategy: decentralization. The ARPANET's architects saw that a computer network which relied upon a single command center would be far too vulnerable to attack. So they built a network with not one center, but many redundant "centers". If an attack destroyed one part of the network, other sections would continue to function.
The legacy of the ARPANET is in many ways a contradictory one. If decentralization made it virtually impossible to destroy the ARPANET via a single strategic strike, it made equally difficult the control of the network from a central point. Once the network of computers was thrown open to those beyond the academic and military communities in the early 1990s others were free to take advantage of the decentralized network in a variety of ways, some of them potentially threatening to the very military (university) industrial complex that created it in the first place. While decentralization makes difficult singular, top-down control it does not represent the very antithesis of control as some Net utopians have maintained. No single institution, group, individual, or government controls the contemporary Internet. Yet this does not mean that it cannot or that it is not being controlled. Despite a history rooted in decentralization, the contemporary Net is both directly and indirectly controlled and regulated in myriad ways by a wide array of players and stakeholders. Among them: national governments, courts, law enforcement agencies, international regulatory entities, computer designers and engineers, software designers, multi-national corporations and media conglomerates, advertisers, system administrators, telecommunication giants, cable providers, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Individuals also control and regulate the Internet: moderators patrol newsgroups and edit listserv newsletters, users police one other in chat rooms, and hackers "hack" the Net to a wide variety of ends, including the destruction and defacement of web sites posting views with which they do not agree. 1 Thus it might be said that the real legacy of ARPANET with respect to the contemporar Internet is one of a kind of widely dispersed and relatively decentralized control. It may be impossible to exercise control over the Internet from a single, centralized point. But there remain nonetheless critical points along its decentralized infrastructure through which control can be effectively and efficiently exercised. I argue in the following analysis that the ISP constitutes precisely one of these points. In bringing into sharp relief the critical role of the ISP in the contemporary architecture of the Internet, I foreground the ways in which issues of privacy and freedom of speech converge upon, and sometimes intersect, at this key technological node. I begin, in Section II, by making an argument for the ISP as a critically situated "gateway" to the Internet, noting, among other things, its unique technological location and how this plays out in terms of the ways in which other Internet structure of power stakeholders are seeking to take advantage of this location. In Section III, I attempt to situate the ISP within a larger architecture of the Internet, the Archimedean point on which this vast global network balances" or, alternatively, as a "passport without which passage across the border into cyberspace is impossible" (Post qtd. in Franda: 48) . According to Marcus Franda,, DNS servers are "single controlling points" "that could potentially be used to choke off access to the Internet" and they therefore "have enormous value in political and economic terms" (48).
That ISPs are perhaps the most critically situated point of control on the "decentralized" Net has not escaped the notice of many of the other "players" who together form its complex we of power. More than 40 countries restrict their citizens' Internet surfing capabilities at the level o the ISP (Denning) , including powerful Western democracies such as Germany. 3 The UK has invested more than $30 million into the construction of an Internet Surveillance Center, the Government Technical Assistance Center (GTAC). Scheduled to be operable before end of 2001 the GTAC "requires local ISPs to hardwire links directly to it, thus enabling government 'securit operators' to download Internet and e-mail traffic, monitor mobile phone networks, and decode encrypted messages" (Franda 160) . And in the United States, the FBI has created a surveillance device known as Carnivore that is attached to ISP servers.
National governments and law enforcement agencies have not been alone in recognizing that ISPs are perhaps the most critically situated points of control on the Net. Recording industr officials and representatives have successfully lobbied ISPs to revoke memberships of subscribers using peer-to-peer music software programs such as Gnutella. Individuals have filed libel suits against ISPs hosting allegedly defamatory newsgroup postings on their servers. And a U.S. law firm recently (and unsuccessfully) sued an ISP in an attempt to force it to reveal the names of anonymous posters whom it alleged had written defamatory things about its business.
ISPs in the U.S. and Britain have been successfully pressured by threats and by cyber attacks int yanking off the web controversial sites hosted on their servers. Employers, whose corporate intranets comprise what some computer analysts maintain is an ISP, now regularly monitor their employees' Net surfing habits and read their e-mail by way of commercial snooping software.
fact commercial and institutional ISPs have long kept tabs on subscriber's online actions by way of server logs. Although many ISPs have implemented policies in which they state that they will not share the information they compile about subscribers, the very fact that they collect and stor this data makes them prime targets for those interested in acquiring it. Those among a potentiall long list of "interested parties" include law enforcement agencies as well as a wide range of private businesses who stand to benefit substantially from gaining access to detailed data about individual Internet users' web surfing habits.
B. ISPs as Flow Directors, Controllers and Surveillance Points
ISPs direct and control the flow of traffic across the Net in a number of crucial ways.
Among the ways in which they can do so:
? ?By potentially preventing subscribers from linking to particular sites; ? ?By taking down "objectionable" web sites on their servers; ? ?By deciding which newsgroups subscribers can and cannot access; ? ?By way of "portals," or the default page that loads onto one's browser when one logs onto the net.
In fact media critic Robert McChesney goes so far as to call ISPs and their customized portals the "killer applications" of the Internet. The statistics which McChesney cites are both revealing and persuasive. For example, American Online controls more than a third of the U.S. market.
And of the 23 million AOL subscribers in the U.S., McChesney points out, a full 80 percent never venture beyond those places at which AOL's ingeniously easy-to-use portal points.
ISPs not only comprise a "choke" point for access and flow but, as many of the above examples attest, quite possibly the most critical --and potentially efficient --points on the Net for surveillance. All users must pass through the ISP "tollbooth" each time they merge onto the Information Superhighway. And they leave behind a trail of centrally stored --and therefore centrally accessible --data every time they sail through this tollbooth. In fact it might be said that the ISP sits at the crossroads of the First and Fourth
Amendments on the Net. If Internet users know that they are being watched as they surf the web write e-mail, post messages to newsgroups, and build web sites, if they know that the electronic trail that they leave behind at their ISP is vulnerable to marketers and law enforcement agencies, they might be inclined to restrict what they say and do. In short, the threat of "chilled" speech lurks at the critically situated ISP gateway to the Net. In fact a number of court cases revolving around ISPs and the anonymity of those who posted messages to newsgroups hosted on an ISP' servers have brought into sharp relief precisely this problem. to allow certain views to be expressed both on, and within, their domain. Indeed there is already evidence --albeit limited evidence, which I will discuss below --that some ISPs might be censoring materials on their networks simply because they fear it might trigger a lawsuit and/or result in irate subscribers fleeing to another ISP.
C. The ISP and the Tension Between Privacy and Freedom
Many scholars have highlighted the crucial and complex relationship between privacy and freedom. "The absence of surveillance and protection of privacy," writes one, "are necessa conditions for both liberal and participatory democracy" (Raab 161 ). However surveillance, and therefore some kind of invasion of privacy, is sometimes necessary to protect freedom. "Trusted systems" advocate and author Mark Stefik contends that three things most frequently come into conflict with privacy --national security and law enforcement, business interests, and personal security. Much is at stake in the struggle to balance these interests. "At what point," ask Caspa which "there are more than 5,000 ISPs in the US," they write, "is inefficient." Furthermore, "The socially optimal number of core ISPs is likely to be relatively small subset of all ISPs" (186).
The point of the above discussion of basic technological and economic structural issues i to emphasize the distinct possibility that, as has occurred in other media and telecommunication industries, the number of ISPs may shrink significantly in the future. It is also to illustrate the fact that even in the contemporary ISP market a relatively few large, core providers boast a substantial share of Internet subscribers. They, along with a handful of telecommunications providers, control the basic infrastructure of the "decentralized" Internet. That this is so has potentially profound implications for Fourth and First Amendment issues as they are evoked at the ISP. For fewer choices and concentrated power can often mean that decisions and policies implemented by a few will end up profoundly affecting the many.
B. The Fourth Amendment and the ISP "There is sort of a dark synergy going on The company collects the data and the government get that data from the company. The fact that it is collected by the company voids your privacy rights." --Lance Cottrell, President of Anonymizer, Inc.
ISPs collect data on subscribers. They know when a subscriber logs on, when she logs off, and where she goes on the Internet. They store subscriber's e-mail and host subscriber web sites. They know subscribers' names, billing addresses, and phone numbers. Furthermore, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are now gaining the power to handle web transactions on behalf of their subscribers. As subscribers purchase goods and services off the Internet, ISPs will be able to bill digital purc hases automatically to their subscribers' accounts. Although this trend allows buyers to purchase digital goods without cumbersome user registration, software downloading, or disclosing credit card information, it allows the ISP to couple its knowledge of an individual's web activity with detailed purchasing histories. (Gautier) In short, key streams of information converge at the ISP. Most ISPs pledge to protect user's privacy. And some are even attempting to capitalize on public fears about privacy violations in ad campaigns. In a recent TV ad campaign, Earthlink pledged to "provide the totally anonymous
Internet" for users (Olsen) . Earthlink claims to know when a subscriber logs on or off its network but not where that person travels (which seemingly isn't exactly the same thing as "the totally anonymous Internet"). Furthermore, the company says that it only keeps such data for 30 days.
However it notes that this data is available to law enforcement agents, should they request it. In fact in 1999 Earthlink became the first ISP to be forced to install the FBI's surveillance device, Carnivore, also know as DCS1000. A power struggle erupted between Earthlink and the FBI over what kind of surveillance device should be attached to Earthlink's servers. It was the FBI that ultimately emerged victorious. It placed Carnivore on Earthlink's servers --which subsequently crashed (Kahaner).
5
The "relationship" between ISPs and both government and business agents and institutions interested in their subscriber data has been the subject of criticism by privacy advocates and civil libertarians. The criticism has come despite ISP commitments to user privac in policy statements such as AOL's "Eight Principles of Privacy." Such policies, note some privacy advocates, typically contain a qualifier that subscriber data may be disclosed in the case of "unlawful activity". Some privacy advocates also claim that ISPs too easily and quickly "roll over" when subpoenaed to hand over subscriber information. They add that while ISPs may indeed have privacy policies in place most subscribers do not have the time to read those policie and that furthermore such polices are often vague and unclear. EPIC's Sobel notes the very fact that ISPs compile data on subscribers puts them in a position where outside interests will invariably seek to access that data. "The more stuff that they collect about subscribers for commercial interests, the more interest they will generate from law enforcement who want to get a hold of that information," he explains (Lemos) . Commercial "interests" confirm Sobel's assertion. "In many ways," writes Mark Sweiger President of the web marketing research firm Under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, ISPs are expected to remove material from subscriber web sites that appears to constitute copyright infringement. However, the DMCA generally limits ISPs from copyright infringement liability for simply transmitting information over the Internet. But the fact that ISPs are not liable for P2P software use that occurs over their network clearly has not stopped the recording industry from pressuring ISPs.
Nor has it stopped many ISPs from yielding to such pressure. In Maxwell, Colonel Maxwell was convicted through "a general court-marshal of service-discrediting conduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for transmitting obscene images via e-mail from his personal computer" (Backes) . However while convicting Maxwell, the U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that transmission of information via e-mail gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy and it recognized "the constitutional prerequis of a search warrant prior to conducting a search of the defendant's e-mail data" (Backes) . On appeal, the Armed Forces Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction based on the legally obtaine search warrant, but emphasized the finding of the lower court that the defendant had a reasonabl expectation of e-mail privacy, albeit a limited one. In establishing a higher threshold for a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis e-mail than that vis-a-vis the telephone, the military courts noted that the use of passwords limit unauthorized access to an individual's messages. Th courts also stressed that the "insulated structure of the ISP network, the contractual privacy arrangement with the ISP and the subjective content of the messages" justified a relatively high expectation of privacy (Backes) .
Subscriber Anonymity and E-mail
In Hambrick, the U.S. The case law record is clearly contradictory with regard to subscribers' expectation of privacy vis-à-vis e-mail. At best, one might, in signing up with an ISP, assume that one's e-mail will be reasonably private (although one can never know if Carnivore is running atop an ISP's network server). At worst, one might assume that the privacy of one's e-mail is wholly suspect.
The latter assumption, of course, has considerable implications in terms of the "chilling of speech" effect about which many privacy advocates and civil libertarians worry.
Workplace Snooping
System administrators running corporate intranet "ISPs" are now acting as both undercover and content police. According to the American Management Association, 54 percent of employers were monitoring their workers' Internet connections and 38 percent were viewing their e-mail as of the fall of 2000, both perfectly legal practices (Waltner) . It is revealing to note that a recent proposal by the federal court system's chief administrator to monitor the Internet communications of the judicial branch encountered such fierce opposition that the administrator was forced to shelve it. In attempting to make his case for snooping, the administrator invoked the oft used approach of accusing those who do not want to be monitored of having something to hide. He even suggested that some of the judges who opposed web monitoring simply wanted easy access to pornograph (Lewis) .
Carnivore
The FBI's Carnivore program comprises perhaps the best known example of how the critically situated ISP gateway is being tapped in order to facilitate surveillance and, as many civil liberties and privacy advocates contend, invade ISP subscriber privacy. Carnivore consists of a hardware unit that can be attached to an ISP network server and what is commonly referred to as "packet sniffing" software which "sniffs" the multiple information packets that comprise electronic mail messages. Carnivore (to which the FBI recently began referring by the more innocuous name DCS1000) can operate in two modes --a full collection mode in which it intercepts the addressing information and content of a target user's electronic communication,
and a "pen collection" mode in which it gathers only the addressing information associated with e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer protocol activity. (Schultz) . Much controversy has swirled around Carnivore's snooping capabilities and the degree to which it can be --or will or will not be --used in a manner such that it will not sift indiscriminately through ISP subscriber e-mail. The controversy persists despite an independent review conducted by the Illinois Institute of Technology Research
Institute to ascertain Carnivore's various capabilities. places and sites by way of well-designed and easy-to-use portals. She also voices concern about a trend toward mergers among Internet companies that "suggests in the future only a handful of private companies will control online communications" (4). Dmitrieva starts from the premise that ISPs in some respects act like a shopping mall, in other respects like a phone company, and in others still like a news provider. She then examines how state action doctrine --which holds that actions by private companies may sometimes qualify as those of the state --has been applie to those entities and discuses whether it therefore might be applied in some cases to ISPs as well. 8 In addressing contemporary ISP court cases, Dmitrieva focuses on a Cyber Promotions v.
America Online decision delivered by a federal district court in Pennsylvania. In its ruling, the court argued that AOL had the right to prevent unsolicited e-mail ads from reaching its customers (18). In its decision, the court defined AOL "as a 'private online company that has invested substantial sums of its own money in equipment, name, software and reputation' " (18) It did not hold as valid the Cyber argument that AOL performs a public function in providing e mail to members. The court also ruled that AOL does not perform "any municipal power or essential public service." Finally, it ruled that Cyber Promotions had alternative means whereby to market its services. Pressure from a state governor may have lead AOL to remove a web site on serial killers from its servers in the late 1990s contends the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). "I think that ISPs feel under increasing pressure from governments to censor by refusing to service controversial sites," asserts the ACLU's Barry Steinhardt in a press release on the issue posted a aclu.org. "They are reacting in the hope that they will avoid more direct government control."
Protests, Attacks, and Threats Lead to ISP Censorship
Interestingly no mention is made by the ACLU about the possibility that a complaint by a single irate citizen (rather than a government official) might have led to removal of the site. This despite the fact that AOL indicates that it would have pulled the site "regardless of who complained."
ISPs, Self-Regulation, Censorship, and "Overcompensation"
Some legal scholars and other critics warn that self-regulation of the kind currently being exercised on the Net will in fact result in over-regulation of content by ISPs. "ISP's are illadapted to handle their role as censors: they do not know, and should not be expected or require to know, the intricacies of the law, and, thus, will err on the side of caution," asserts Amber Jene
Sayle in a legal essay published in the Wisconsin International Law Journal. "As such, ISP's will be censoring speech that is protected under the Constitution. Thus, the problems with self regulation in a nation that adheres to the belief of free speech become apparent: unconstitutional censorship is bound to ensue." It is primarily the specter of libel suits and what Sayle describes as "the lurking presence of governmental re gulation" that will push ISPs toward censoring controversial speech, whether on message boards, in chat rooms, or on web sites, she says. Adam
Newey advances a similar argument, asserting that private censorship puts ISPs in position to "overcompensate" to limit their liability. Newey extends the argument further than Sayle, asserting that subscribers might be discouraged "from pushing the limits of acceptability, through fear of having their service cut off by the ISP" (34). Newey quotes U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy to support his argument:
'Online service providers should not be forced to become private censors: If online services or individual system operators are held liable for all of their users' communications, the services will be forced to impose stringent censorship rules on their users in order to limit corporate liability of the service provider. Such rules would create a chilling effect on users of interactive media …' (34)
Others have highlighted potential problems of absolving ISPs of responsibility for that which is conduit for information, as opposed to a publisher, and therefore is no more responsible than a telephone company for defamatory materials transmitted over its lines. In making its ruling, the court upheld a lower court decision dismissing a defamation lawsuit brought against Prodigy Services Co., by the father of a Boy Scout whose identity was usurped by an unknown impostor
The imposter posted vulgar messages in the boy's name on an electronic bulletin board and e mailed abusive, threatening and sexually explicit messages, also in the boy's name, to the local scoutmaster (Caher) .
In another law journal article, Christopher Butler contends that the courts and Congress have extended protection of ISPs too far, arguing that "if an ISP commissions and edits information content in a manner analogous to a newspaper or book publishers, it should be held to the stricter 'publisher' (rather than 'distributor') standard of fault." However, the case law record regarding ISP liability is mixed. In 1995, a Nassau County trial court held in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy that Prodigy had editorial control over the content of messages posted on a electronic forum and, therefore, was responsible for potentially libelous statements made by one of its users. "There is still a question of whether an ISP has complete immunity for anything tha happens on its system," notes one attorney who tracks Internet-related rulings (Butler) .
A British case in which an ISP agreed to a 200,000 pound out-of-court settlement after it failed to act on a request by an individual to remove libelous materials from one of its newsgroups seemingly underscores the very real danger that libel suits or the threat of libel suits against ISPs could be wielded as indiscriminate tools of censorship. In this particular case, the litigant successfully pressured a second ISP into shutting down the web site for the Campaign Against Censorship of the Internet in Britain (CACIB), complaining about the site's coverage of the case above. The ISP that hosted the CACIB site explained that "the costs of defending a potential libel action would be prohibitive even though a defense is most likely to be successful"
("Challenge to ISP Censorship"). Finally, it was in part the threat of potentially debilitating libel suits aimed at individual --and therefore vulnerable --ISPs that motivated the formation of the now defunct Zero Knowledge Systems, the consortium of ISPs who sought to provide anonymous web access, surfing and publishing. "ISPs can't afford to fight," one of the consortium members at the time it was founded (Zelnick).
ISP Censorship Issues in Germany and France
In an example which dramatically illustrates the apparent validity of Sayle's assertion tha "the lurking presence of government regulation" is inspiring ISP censorship, in Germany, where ISPs said that if the Web site were to resurface, it might take the case to a French appeals court (MacMillan). The above cases dramatically illustrate the sheer complexity of free speech issues on the Net and underscore the fact the ISPs are becoming perhaps the most critically situated players in content regulation of the Net.
D. When the First and Fourth Amendments Intersect at the ISP
While this analysis has thus far highlighted instances where freedom of speech and privacy for the most part bear down separately upon the ISP, issues of privacy and freedom of speech sometimes intersect at the ISP as well --with potentially profound implications for dissent. In a recent case in California, a disgruntled employee of the Orange County Register created a web site on AOL called "The Orange County Unregister" mocking the newspaper. The newspaper brought suit against AOL, relying primarily on a claim of trademark infringement. It then had a subpoena served on AOL in an attempt to force it to reveal the identity of the web site's author. AOL complied and the web site was shut down by its creator shortly thereafter (Pomeroy) .
Online anonymity can be destructive as illustrated by the Prodigy v. Lunney case in which a user usurped another's identity and proceeded to defame him. But it can also be seen a integral to maintaining the free speech rights of the less powerful in society as well as the rights of those whose views might either be unpopular and/or potentially disturbing (without necessarily being libelous) to other individuals, groups, or institutions or businesses. The above cases dramatically underscore the critical role that ISPs are currently playing in a contemporary regulatory regime characterized largely, though not wholly, by self-regulation. The potential implications of maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis this regime as well some possible alternatives, alterations, modifications and changes are discussed below.
IV. Conclusion

A. The Ambiguous Legal Status of the ISP
The "decentralized" legacy of ARPANET has placed ISPs center stage. They are the gateways to the contemporary Internet, its traffic police, and its most "centralized" and efficient point of control and surveillance. Like it or not they have been appointed de facto --though often grudging --arbiters of privacy and freedom of speech on the Net. As some observers have noted they have positioned themselves as key surveillance points due in large part to the fact that they systematically monitor and collect what amounts to prized data on their subscribers' actions
online. Yet despite their crucial position, their legal status is unclear. The FCC officially designates them as enhanced or information service providers. And statutory and case law has often --though not always --protected them in such a way that one might say that the ISP has come to be implicitly defined as a common carrier.
The many ways in which the ISP traverses and collapses technological boundaries and categories place it in a legal gray area. The ISP performs functions comparable to that of a common carrier, for instance the basic transmission of information. Yet it also acts in some respects like a cable provider, for example delivering access to some newsgroups but not others.
In some cases, ISPs deliver access and services across cable lines and are also a cable provider
The ISP stores data in many forms and thus provides what the FCC has described as "enhanced or "information services." It acts as a publisher of sorts, hosting web sites and newsgroups although it does not typically exercise editorial control in the same focused and directed ways that a newspaper or magazine publisher does. The ISP provides access to live television and radio broadcasts as well as a vast array of videos and music and thus acts like a broadcaster. ISP are also the conduit through which direct computerized telephone and/or videophone communication occurs. The list of services provided by the ISP and the various functions and roles it performs is long and complex indeed. In a paper published in the Tulane Law Review which he argues that large cable providers/ISPs such as AT&T should not be required to open their lines to competing ISPs, Raymond Shih Ray Ku notes that current First Amendment doctrine determines the level of protection afforded a media entity based upon certain conceptual categories. Accordingly, under this framework, we must ask whether Internet service providers are more like common carriers, speakers, or gatekeepers. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is an unenlightening, yes. ISPs, cable and otherwise, perform functions and provide services similar to telephone companies, newspapers, broadcasters, and cable television providers.
The lack of clarity with respect to the legal status of ISPs has inspired many to make comparisons to other mediums. Why, for example, aren't Internet users afforded the same statutory privacy safeguards afforded to the cable-TV subscriber and video renters, asks one EPIC attorney. And why not grant official common carrier status to ISPs, ask others. Some, troubled by the fact that private entities need not go through a formal legal process to gain information about ISP subscribers have proposed amending the ECPA so that private companies would be required to go through some kind of formalized procedure in order to obtain such data, and that furthermore subscribers be required to be informed before data could be acquired.
The extent of the confusing technological haze and legal maze within which ISPs are enveloped and entangled is strikingly illustrated by the fact that the FCC is considering designating Internet access by cable a "cable service." Such a decision would mean that provisions of the Cable TV Privacy Act of 1984 would be applied to Internet use over cables but not over telephone lines . An ISP would thus face extensive restrictions on the disclosure of personal information of a subscriber accessing the Net via cable, but far fewer restrictions for subscribers logging on to the Net via a modem (Pomeroy) .
B. Some Proposals for Clarifying the Status of the ISP
The fuzziness with respect to the legal status of perhaps the most critically situated players in the contemporary structure of power and control on the Internet has led many to propose a variety of changes. Some like Ku and Dmitrieva contend that the process of clarifying the status of ISPs and the privacy and free speech issues which are profoundly affected by its status would be best accomplished in the courts. The conceptual complexity and specificity of many of the issues that swirl around the ISP would be best addressed on a case by case basis, they say. Dmitrieva concedes that it is a potential problem that ISPs remain outside the bounds o the First Amendment with respect to issues of censorship, but argues against sweeping constitutional or statutory changes.
In deciding the complex issues of state action as it relates to private Internet companies, courts will have to balance important countervailing interests: the First Amendment interests of Internet users and free speech rights of Internet providers; the proprietary interests of Internet companies and the democratic ideals of the U.S. society. (22) Citing the Judges do not possess the technical expertise and knowledge to make the necessary determinations in deciding whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular Internet related activity. If changes are not made at the legislative level, courts will continue to make individual determinations that could result in a lack of uniformity in protection.
Elmore, whose brief makes an argument that the ECPA is so vague as to offer no real legal basis upon which to regulate Carnivore, proposes amendments to the ECPA such that the definition of "electronic communications" would list e-mail specifically, and that furthermore the ECPA be defined to include all parts of an e-mail, including header, address, and body packets. Joseph
Kampherstein in a Temple and Environmental Law & Technology Journal article that focuses on
Carnivore also contends that changes in statutory law are needed to clarify and bolster privacy rights with respect to e-mail:
The Fourth Amendment was designed with the thought that one's "papers and effects" were among the most desirous of protection from the intrusions of government. Cong should recognize that storage of e-mail at an ISP is most closely analogous to storage of postal mail in a post office box until retrieval and reading, and therefore offer a higher degree of protection to stored e-mail. The definition of "interception" should include the opening or deletion of e-mail prior to opening by the recipient. This definition is already gaining judicial acceptance, and should be recognized and clarified through legislation.
Others contend the current regulatory scheme is adequate. In an article in The Internet Newslette Platform for Internet Content Selection is most frequently mentioned --much like that described by Lawrence Lessig 10 would be instituted.
C. The Future Status of the ISP and Privacy and Free Speech on the Net
Nothing less than the future of basic privacy and free speech rights is at stake in the As legislators rush to embrace the residual benefits of e-commerce while strangling gateways and exchanges with filters, encryption restrictions, and content banishment, Internet service providers and Web content hosts must prepare for serious government attempts to eradicate freedom of expression on the Internet. If service providers don't tak a stand and act now, what was once referred to as the 'Information Superhighway' enriched by a free flow of Internet content and unrestricted access, may have less conten than public access television, with ISPs and WPPs acting as the 'Net Police' of the world
Although it is not possible here to develop a detailed regulatory framework that would once and for all clarify the status and role of the ISP, simply keeping the current regime of self-regulation intact is highly problematic. The kind of self-regulation in which ISPs for the most part now engage could, as some predict, increasingly become dictated by outside forces and thus inspire a kind of anxiety driven self-censorship that begins to threaten free expression on the Net. Self regulation practiced under pressure from outside forces and the fear of potentially debilitating libel suits could also threaten the privacy of subscribers whose identities might be revealed too easily --to both government and private entities --by anxious ISPs. And anxious subscribers could ultimately mean "chilled speech." Finally, with the lurking specter of concentration of ownership, the problems with a self-regulatory regime mentioned here could well be intensified.
Given trends in other media, it is not far-fetched to predict that the future will bring fewer and fewer ISPs who will act as the gateways, flow directors and monitors for more and more subscribers. Fewer and larger ISPs could lead to a homogenizing effect in which those ISPs, pressured by dominant mainstream interests, might become increasingly likely to censor "unpopular" ideas and points of view and/or limit access to those points of view. Although there are many important differences between newspaper publishers and ISPs, larger newspapers with more readers typically deliver a much more homogenized and sanitized news product than smaller publications from both the right and left wings of the political spectrum. They do so arguably because it is in their economic interest to please the most readers and offend the fewest
Certainly it is not out of the realm of possibility that it could come to be in the economic interest of a few large ISPs to chart a similarly safe course with respect to "fringe" ideas posted on newsgroups and "radical" points of view expressed in "controversial" web sites. In a market of extreme concentration of ownership (by no means an assured development), it is conceivable tha subscribers could have few if any choices outside of the larger, politically and ideologically sanitized ISPs.
If keeping the current regulatory regime in place is problematic, so too is relying exclusively upon case law to determine the future status of the ISP and the multiple privacy and freedom of speech issues that swirl around it. A combination of carefully considered changes in statutory law and subsequent clarifications made by way of case law may be best approach. No matter what regulatory scheme is pursued it is imperative that it seek to vigorously protect the privacy and free speech rights of ISP subscribers. "Personal privacy," writes Stefik, "is about freedom from surveillance, freedom from intrusion, and security for our personal records. All these themes of privacy concern preventing other people from monitoring our activities" (199).
And Bowden and Akdeniz assert that, Security authorities argue that flexible options for large-scale surveillance are needed for intelligence-led operations to counter organised crime, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But if the design of the new communications infrastructure is predicated on an absolute capability to counter such threats, the resulting apparatus is indistinguishable from that required to anticipate, subvert, and neutralise political dissent (101).
In chiseling out a workable regulatory framework which adequately addresses the many complexities inherent to the ISP and its critical position with respect to issues of privacy and fre speech, we must ensure that the right to dissent so fundamental to modern democracy does not get quashed in the process. We must be careful not to give in to a dominant view in which an expanding regime of electronic surveillance increasingly comes to be justified by the commonsense notion "I didn't do anything wrong, why should I be worried 2 DNS "structures the assignment of names on the network and converts those names to their unique I addresses" (King et al. 18) . In other words it ensures that specific information requests sent across the Network via a Transfer Control Protocol command (TCP) will result in the right information being sent t an individual Internet user at a unique Internet Protocol address.
3 Germany in 1997 passed into law the Information and Communication Services Act (ISCA). The ISCA subjects ISPs to criminal prosecution for knowingly acting as a conduit for illegal content that it is technically possible to halt in transmission. The ISCA also requires that ISP offices have bureaucrats, o "Youth Protection Officers," to troll the Internet for objectionable material. In addition, it makes it crime to disseminate or make accessible materials deemed harmful to children (McGuire).
4 "The set of full routes contained in the core routers' tables defines the reach of the Internet. Each devic associated with an IP address (or net ID) stored in the core routers' tables can communicate with all othe devices associated with IP addresses at those tables. A device that is not associated with any IP address i the full routing table will be invisible to a large portion of the Internet. Given the rapid expansion of th Internet, maintenance of the core routing tables is a critical and demanding task for the core ISPs." (Milgrom et al 180; authors' emphasis) 5 According to a detailed Information Week account of the incident published an April 2001 issue, in December 1999, U.S. marshals served officials of EarthLink with a court order to install a commerciall available device called "EtherPeek," which would be connected to the ISP's Pasadena, Calif., network hu to let the government monitor electronic messages on the system. Citing concerns that the device migh be capable of snooping in on all subscribers' data, Earthlink sought and received permission to put its ow customized surveillance software on the network. However the government insisted on installing its ow device. EarthLink filed a motion to quash the original court order. During this legal proceeding the government revealed that it planned to use a new, proprietary device by the name of Carnivore. Carnivor was incompatible with EarthLink's operating system software and EarthLink crashed. Information Wee reports that, "Exactly when it crashed and for how long and the extent of the damage, if any, that wa caused by Carnivore or whether customer E-mails were delayed or lost is unclear because EarthLink an the FBI refuse to discuss the episode. The magistrate's order is sealed from public view, and Earthlink officials won't discuss it." An Earthlink spokesperson is quoted by Information Week as saying, "We hav a business relationship with the FBI now. We have our own method to give them what they want." (Kahaner) .
their clients' work. Once the music is found, the IP address of the computer on which files are sitting i identified. The companies then cross-reference the information with the ISP that owns the IP address an send a letter that documents which files are being shared and which demands that the subscriber be stopped.
7 EPIC and the ACLU charged that the review, which was released on Nov. 21 2000, was not independ of government influence and that the DOJ report had been "sanitized." The review found that the Carnivore program works pretty much the way the FBI said and that it did not overcollect extraneous dat from untargeted subjects, as privacy advocates feared. However, the reviewers did find that it failed t adequately track individual accountability for all Carnivore actions and they recommended that the FB establish additional safeguards when using the system ("Institute's Report on Carnivore Causes Upro Among Critics").
8 Dmitrieva finds the case law record mixed with respect to the application of the state action doctrine t shopping malls, noting that in some cases state supreme courts have allowed demonstrators and picketer access to malls (in California and New Jersey) but not in others (Minnesota). In examining the case law record with respect to news providers, she finds that "as a rule, courts are reluctant to find state action i cases involving First Amendment challenges to conduct of private news providers. Even state-owned news media, such as public television stations, enjoy a large degree of editorial discretion in defining th content of their programming" (15).With respect to telephone companies, Dmitrieva finds that they "ma adopt content-based regulations on speech as long as they do it as a matter of independent business policy" (16). But she also notes that if states exercise pressure on phone companies to pursue particula practices and polices the "courts could find an element of state action" (17). Service. Content, in keeping with tradition, is allocated the highest degree of protection from governmental intrusion. Government officials are required to obtain a warrant to gain access to the contents of communications in electronic storage for less than 180 days. The protocol is slightly mor relaxed if the content of the communication has been in storage for more than 180 days. In that case without giving the required notice to the subscriber, government officials still must obtain a warrant. However, according to the statute, if government officials notify the subscriber through a subpoena o court order, they have the authority to demand disclosure of the content information from the subscriber' ISP. For the contents of electronic communications in a remote computing service, the same rules appl as for communications in electronic storage for over 180 days."
10 In his seminal book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace Lessig proposes a code-driven architectur which deploys digital certificate technologies and zoning as the best way to strike a balance between freedom and constraint and to realizing the individual and collective accountability he views as necessar to achieve freedom on the Internet. Under such an architecture, users would need digital ID's to wande the "hallways" of the Internet, but their anonymity would be protected by "trusted third parties" who could certify facts about them using "dual" or "asymmetric encryption". User's freedom of movemen across the Net would be conditioned based on customized credentials held by the users. So, for example, user with a child's ID would not hold the necessary credentials to access parts of the Net that had bee electronically zoned to keep them out. As a sort of driver's license for the Net, t he digital certificate issue to users could also be used to hold individuals accountable for unlawful actions.
